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notice of claim statutes. 103 In so doing, the decision furnishes yet
another argument for legislative elimination of such notice of claim

statutes.

104

ChristopherM. Murphy
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

Penal Law § 70.08: Multiple prior sentences and not convictions
are required before a defendant may be sentenced as a persistent
felony offender
Statutes imposing harsher penalties upon repeat offenders
have been enacted in most states. 10 5 New York adopted the first
recidivist statute in the country in 1796,106 and continues to pro103The primary purpose of notice of claim statutes "is to discourage fraudulent claims
against municipalities by requiring notice while the claim is still fresh enough for the defendant to investigate it." McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 449, 454 (1968);
supra note 71. Professor Graziano suggests that the real objective of these statutes is to
protect the "public purse." See Graziano, supra note 71, at 364. It is submitted that neither
purpose is fostered by the notice statutes, since, as Giblin affirmed, courts may grant leave
to serve late notice of claim beyond the statute of limitations period, provided there was
tolling, regardless of whether the defendant had notice. See 61 N.Y.2d at 75, 459 N.E.2d at
859, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 566. Indeed, though the amendment to GML alleviated the harsh results that accompanied a plaintiff's failure to service timely notice, see SIEGEL § 32, at 32,
plaintiff's action will still be dismissed if he, though serving a timely summons and complaint, fails to apply to the court for leave to serve a late notice of claim prior to the expiration of the limitations period, see, e.g., Briganti v. Harrison Cent. School Dist., 91 App. Div.
2d 648, 648, 457 N.Y.S.2d 89, 90 (2d Dep't 1982); Moore v. City of New York, 84 App. Div.
2d 562, 562, 443 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d 950, 439 N.E.2d 331,
453 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1982).
104 See McLaughlin, supra note 103, at 454. Over 15 years ago, Professor McLaughlin
asked "whether the good to be achieved by [notice of claim] statute[s] is outweighed by the
harm it does to honest claimants." Id. Professor McLaughlin "remains unconvinced that the
legislature has made the right judgment." Id. at 453. Presently, in light of the trend to
abolish sovereign immunity, see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 131, at 1032 (5th ed. 1984), it is submitted that Professor McLaughlin's conclusion
appears even more persuasive.
105 See 1 H. ROTHBLATT, CRIMINAL LAW OF NEW YORK 438 n.13 (1978); Katkin, Habitual
Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 99, 104 (1971). Until the 19th century, even the most trifling crimes were punishable by death or severe prison terms. See id.
Therefore, recidivism is a relatively new social problem, id. at 99, which proponents of harsher penalties for repeat offenders claim can be addressed by recidivist statutes because
they deter crime and afford protection to society, id. at 103.
106 See H. ROTHBLATT, supra note 105, at 438-40. New York was the first state to adopt
a recidivist statute. See CRIMINAL LAW, Ch. 30 [1976] N.Y. Laws 699 (current version in
scattered sections of the N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984)) Originally,
the statute dealt only with second offenders. See id. In 1907, provisions were enacted by the
legislature that imposed harsher sentences for fourth offenders. See PENAL LAW, Ch. 645
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vide enhanced punishment for repeat offenders in sections 70.02,
70.04, and 70.08 of the New York Penal Law. 10 7 In an attempt to
deal more harshly with repeat violent criminals, the legislature
mandated enhanced punishment for persistent violent felony offenders under section 70.08.108 Recently, in People v. Morse,1 9 the
[1907] N.Y. Laws 1494 (repealed 1965).
107

N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.02, 70.04, 70.08 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Section 70.02

defines violent felony offenses and sets out the applicable prison sentences. Id. § 70.02. Section 70.04 defines a second violent felony offender as:
A person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision
one of section 70.02 after having previously been subjected to a predicate violent
felony conviction as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
Id. § 70.04(1)(a). If the prior conviction was for a class A felony or a violent felony as defined in § 70.02, it constitutes a predicate violent conviction under § 70.04. Id. §
70.04(1)(b)(i). The statute further provides that a conviction "of an offense defined by the
penal law in effect prior to September first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, which includes all
of the essential elements of [a violent] felony" shall also constitute a predicate offense. Id.
Moreover, a prior conviction obtained in another state that includes the essential elements
of a New York violent felony also shall constitute a predicate offense. See id. In addition,
the sentence upon the prior conviction "must have been imposed before commission of the
present felony" to qualify as a predicate offense. Id. § 70.04(1)(b)(i).
Section 70.08 defines a persistent violent felony offender as:
A person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision
one of section 70.02 after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of
section 70.04.
Id. § 70.08(1)(a). The section further provides that, "[f]or the purpose of determining
whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions, the criteria set forth
in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 apply." Id. § 70.08(1)(b).
1"8 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.08 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see also id. § 70.04, commentary at 154-55 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); id. § 70.08, commentary at 160-61 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); id. § 70.02, commentary at 149 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). It is
evident from the floor debate that the state legislature intended to deal more harshly with
repeat offenders. See Legislative Bill Jacket to Act of July 18, 1978, [1974] N.Y. Laws, Ch.
481. During the debate in the Senate, it was noted that:
Hardly a day goes by without reports of murder, rape, muggings and other vicious
violent crimes by adults and juveniles. Our present law cannot cope with these
problems. The result is that the adult offender and juvenile offenders are returned
to the streets time and time again to resume this heinous conduct.
Id. at 285-86 (statement of Senator Barclay). Senator Halperin, in another comment indicative of legislative intent, noted that:
I am gratified to see that we [are] . . . providing for increased penalties for all
violent offenders but particularly setting aside those who commit two violent felonies and particularly restoring the old three-time-loser law, which will subject
those who have committed three violent felonies to life imprisonment or the possibility of life imprisonment.
Id. at 464 (statement of Senator Halperin).
A study of criminal recidivism has shown that serious crimes are more likely to be committed by repeat offenders. See R. FISHMAN, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN NEW YORK CITY-AN
EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF REHABILITATION & DIVERSION SERVICES 36-37 (1977).
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Court of Appeals held that a person convicted of two or more violent felonies on the same day who is sentenced to serve concurrent
prison terms may not be sentenced as a persistent violent felony
offender for a subsequent crime, even if the earlier convictions
were for unrelated offenses. 110 The Court further held that a crime
that had not been designated a violent felony when committed
may, nevertheless, serve as a predicate violent felony for purposes
of enhanced sentencing if the crime is currently classified as a violent felony.'
In Morse, the defendant had been convicted previously of robbery in the first degree for two separate incidents, 1'2 and had been
sentenced to concurrent prison terms for both crimes on the same
4
day in 1974.13 In People v. Frank, a companion case to Morse,1
the defendant Frank had been convicted of robbery in the second
degree and burglary in the second degree for which he had been
sentenced to concurrent prison terms in March, 1978. 11 After the
enactment of section 70.02 of the penal law in 1978, both defendants' earlier crimes were classified retroactively as violent felony
offenses.1 6 Since the present convictions of the defendants were
for violent felony offenses, both were sentenced as persistent vio109

62 N.Y.2d 205, 465 N.E.2d 12, 476 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1984).

110 Id. at 224, 465 N.E.2d at 21, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 514.

" Id. at 217, 465 N.E.2d at 16, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 510; see supra note 107. Certain offenses, not previously violent felonies, were classified as violent felonies under the violent
felony laws that became effective on September 1, 1978. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see also People v. Aiello, 93 App. Div. 2d 864, 864, 461 N.Y.S.2d
370, 371 (2d Dep't 1983); CRIM. PROc. LAw § 400.15, commentary at 219 (McKinney 1983).
1'2 People v. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d 205, 214, 465 N.E.2d 12, 15, 476 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508
(1984).
11 Id. Morse had previously pleaded guilty to 17 counts of robbery stemming from 17
separate robberies. Id. at 226-27, 465 N.E.2d at 22, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (Jasen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 Id. at 213-14, 465 N.E.2d at 14, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08. Also decided in companion
cases with Morse were People v. Covington, People v. Vega, People v. Frank, and People v.
Johnson. Id. The cases were consolidated on appeal because questions of the application of
enhanced prison sentences for violent felony offenders were raised in each. Id.
15 Id. at 214, 465 N.E.2d at 15, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
"I See id. at 215, 465 N.E.2d at 15, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 508; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §
70.02 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Section 70.02, which became effective in 1978, was enacted due to the concern over the increase in "stranger-to-stranger" violent crimes. See id. §
70.02, commentary at 149 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The defendants, Morse and Frank,
contended that the legislature did not intend for crimes that were not classified as violent
felonies when committed to constitute predicate violent felony offenses. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at
215-16, 465 N.E.2d at 16, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 507-08.
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lent felony offenders based on their earlier convictions."' In both
instances, the Court of Appeals vacated the sentence of persistent
violent felony offender and remitted for a sentence of second violent felony offender."'
Judge Meyer, writing for the majority,119 found a clear legislative intent to reclassify as violent felony offenses those crimes committed prior to the enactment of section 70.04 of the Penal Law
that satisfy the subsequently amended criteria for such classification. 120 The Court noted that the legislature provided for retroactive application of the statute to crimes committed in other jurisdictions and crimes committed prior to September 1, 1967."2'
Consequently, Judge Meyer found it inconceivable that the legislature would exclude crimes committed in New York between September 1, 1967 and September 1, 1978.122 The Court also determined that the reclassification of the earlier crimes committed by
the defendants was not a violation of the prohibition against 1ex
23
post facto laws contained in the United States Constitution.
117

Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 214, 465 N.E.2d at 14, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 507.

118 Id. at 226, 465 N.E.2d at 10, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
119 Judge Meyer wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined

by Chief Judge Cooke
and Judges Wachtler and Kaye. Judge Jasen dissented and was joined by Judges Jones and
Simons.
120 Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 217, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509. Judge Meyer noted
that two of the general purposes of the Penal Law are "'[t]o insure the public safety by
preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required in the
interests of public protection,'" id. at 216, 465 N.E.2d at 16, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509 (quoting
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney 1975)), and "'[io give fair warning of the nature of
the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction,'" id. at 216-17, 465
N.E.2d at 16, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(2) (McKinney 1975)).
The majority then construed the violent felony offender sections in accordance with these
general purposes and the rule providing that the provisions of the New York Penal Law
shall "be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect
the objects of the law," N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 1975), and held that the legislature intended retroactive application of the enhanced punishment provisions, Morse, 62
N.Y.2d at 216, 465 N.E.2d at 16, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
121Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 217, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509; see N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.04(1)(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); see also supra note 107.
22 Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 217, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509. Judge Meyer also
reasoned that clauses (iv) and (v) of § 70.04, which require enhanced punishment for predicate crimes occurring more than 10 years before the present conviction, added support to
the Court's conclusion. Id. at 217, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
123 Id.; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. In addition to deciding the ex post facto issue,
the Court had to rule on defendant Vega's contention that § 70.02(1)(d) violates the Due
Process Clause. 62 N.Y.2d at 226, 465 N.E.2d at 22, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 515. Under §
70.02(1)(d), criminal possession of a weapon is a violent felony only if the conviction is the
result of a guilty plea. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). The
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Judge Meyer reasoned that enhanced sentencing for repeat offenders is not an added punishment for prior crimes but rather an enhanced penalty for the present crime. 124 Moreover, the majority
determined that the present crime is considered a greater wrong
because the defendant previously had committed a crime of the
125
same category.
The Court vacated the persistent violent felony adjudication
of the lower courts, reasoning that since the defendants each were
convicted of their previous crimes on the same day and served concurrent jail terms, they were, in effect, second, rather than persistent, violent felony offenders.1 26 Further, in interpreting the Penal
Law and its legislative history, the Court held that "sequentiality
applies as between predicate convictions. 1 1 2 7 Judge Meyer stated
Court, however, citing People v. Felix, 58 N.Y.2d 156, 446 N.E.2d 757, 460 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1983), found no such due process violation because the current sentence is not solely dependent on the prior conviction. Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 226, 465 N.E.2d at 22, 476 N.Y.S.2d at
515.
124 Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 216-17, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 510. In
reaching the
conclusion that enhanced sentencing is not added punishment for prior crimes, Judge Meyer
relied on Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). In Weaver, the Florida legislature changed
the manner in which it calculated the allowance for meritorious conduct or exceptional industry in determining the length of a jail term. Id. at 26-27. The petitioner, Weaver, a convicted murderer, brought a complaint alleging that the new statute would increase his
prison sentence by over 2 years. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court found this to be a violation of
the restriction against ex post facto laws and held the Florida statute unconstitutional. Id.
at 32. However, the Weaver Court stated that "[c]ritical to relief under the ex post facto
clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when
the crime was consummated." Id. at 30. The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of recidivist statutes as early as 1948, in Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). In
Gryger, the Court noted that "[tihe sentence as a ...habitual criminal is not to be viewed
as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened penalty
for the latest crime which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a repetitive
one." Id. (quoted in Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 217-18, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 510).
More recently, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980), the Supreme Court stated
that states have a right to use "recidivist statutes [to deal] in a harsher manner with those
who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to
the norms of society as established by its criminal law." Id.
125 Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 217-18, 465 N.E.2d at 22, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
26 Id. at 218, 465 N.E.2d at 17, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 510. The prosecutor argued that the
omission from § 70.08 of the requirement of § 70.10, the persistent felony offender section,
that there be two or more jail sentences, was an intentional rejection by the legislature of
having such a requirement in the section concerning persistent violent felony offenders. Id.
Judge Meyer posited that requiring at least two separate jail sentences before a person
could be adjudicated a persistent violent felony offender allows the defendant an added
opportunity to reform, which is an implicit element multiple offender statutes. 62 N.Y.2d at
223-24, 465 N.E.2d at 20-21, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
2I Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 225, 465 N.E.2d at 21, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 514. "Sequentiality"
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that to be within the ambit of the more stringent sentencing criteria of section 70.08, the defendants in the present action would
have had to have been convicted twice previously in circumstances
in which the second conviction came after the sentencing in the
first action.12
Dissenting from the part of the majority opinion that required
sequentiality between predicate convictions, Judge Jasen contended that rather than interpret the persistent violent felony statute, the majority in effect had amended it. 1 29 The dissent urged
requires that before a second offense can operate as a predicate offense, a non-concurrent
separate sentence must have been imposed for the first offense. Id. at 215, 465 N.E.2d at 15,
476 N.Y.S.2d at 508. Judge Meyer read § 70.08 to require that an offender be subjected to
"the chastening effect of sentence on the prior conviction" before any enhanced sentences
for later offenses could be meted out. Id. at 219, 465 N.E.2d at 17-18, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 51011.
The first recidivist statute in New York was enacted in 1796. Id. at 219, 465 N.E.2d at
18, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 511; see CRIMINAL LAW, Ch. 30 [1796] N.Y. Laws 669 (current version in
scattered sections of N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1983-1984)); supra note
106 and accompanying text. The issue of the "sequentiality of convictions" requirement,
however, had not been litigated prior to the amendment of the law in 1926. See Morse, 62
N.Y.2d at 219 n.8, 465 N.E.2d at 18 n.8, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 511 n.8. A later amendment to the
Penal Law stated that "[flor purposes of this section, conviction of two or more crimes
charged in separate counts of one indictment or information, or in two or more indictments
or information consolidated for trial, shall be deemed only one conviction." PENAL LAW, Ch.
328, 510 [1936] N.Y. Laws 681-82. This provision was construed to mandate a life sentence
for a defendant who pleaded guilty to three prior consecutively numbered, but separate,
forgery indictments. See People v. Taylor, 16 App. Div. 2d 944, 229 N.Y.S.2d 862 (2d Dep't
1962), aff'd mem., 13 N.Y.2d 675, 191 N.E.2d 670, 241 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1963). But see People
ex. rel. Janosko v. Fay, 6 N.Y.2d 82, 86-88, 160 N.E.2d 34, 37-38, 188 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481-83
(1959) (defendant not sentenced as a fourth felony offender when two prior indictments
resulting in guilty verdicts were tried before same judge and jury). Due in part to such
inconsistencies in judicial interpretation, The Temporary Commission on Revision of the
Penal Law (the Commission) found "the present structure [of the Penal Law] to be anything but a cohesive, well-organized unit, permeated as it is with inconsistencies, ambiguities, inequities and archaisms." Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal and Criminal Code, 1963 Report to the Legislature, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 8 at 27. In 1965, pursuant to
the Commission's recommendation, the legislature enacted the revised Penal Law, PENAL
LAW Ch. 1030 [1965] N.Y. Laws 2343, which contained a persistent felony offender section,
see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984).
In 1973, the legislature enacted § 70.06, which requires mandatory enhanced sentencing
for second felony offenders. PENAL LAW, Ch. 277, § 9 [1973] N.Y. Laws 1070-71 (current
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984)). Section 70.06
provides that sentence on a prior conviction must be imposed before a later offense can be
treated as a second felony offense for sentencing purposes. Id.
128 Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 225, 465 N.E.2d at 21, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 514; cf. supra note 127
(discussing requirement of sequentiality for second felony offenders under § 70.06).
12 Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 231, 465 N.E.2d at 25, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen contended that the majority found a sequentiality requirement in § 70.08
that the legislature chose to exclude. Id. at 227, 465 N.E.2d at 23, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 516
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that there was no requirement in the statute of multiple prior
sentences; rather, multiple prior convictions would suffice to require enhanced sentencing under the provisions of section 70.08.130
Judge Jasen noted that the requirement of multiple prior
sentences is present in another subsection of Article 70 of the Penal Law, but is conspicuously missing from section 70.08.131 Consequently, the dissent argued that, when a statute is unambiguous, a
court may not infer "unstated
requirements" from the legislative
13 2
history of related statutes.
In Morse, it is submitted that the majority erred in construing
the language of the statute to require multiple prison terms before
a defendant may be sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. 3 ' In addition, it is suggested that the holding of the Morse
(Jasen, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent questioned the heightened scrutiny that it
found was given to the statute by the majority. See id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen stated that "[a]n examination of the statutory scheme for repeat felony offenders clearly demonstrates that under the persistent-violent statute there is no requirement for multiple separate prior sentences. Rather, multiple
prior convictions are sufficient to trigger its enhanced sentencing provisions." Id. (Jasen, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
1" See Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 231-32, 465 N.E.2d at 24-25, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
"I Id. at 232, 465 N.E.2d at 25, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen
argued that the provisions of § 70.08, which he contended required only convictions of multiple prior violent felony offenses, should be applied. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen
agreed with the long-standing policy that multiple prior convictions stemming from crimes
that shared the same time, place, or nature should be treated as a single predicate crime for
purposes of recidivist statutes. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Yet he contended that the defendants in Morse and a companion case, although convicted on one day, were, nevertheless,
guilty of distinct felonies and, therefore, should have been sentenced under the persistent
violent felony offender statute. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 224-25, 465 N.E.2d at 21, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 514. It is suggested that the Court's
decision in Morse does not accurately reflect the intent of the legislature. Had the legislature intended the result that the Morse Court reached, it is submitted that § 70.08 would
have been cross referenced with § 70.10. Section 70.10 of the Penal Law clearly requires
multiple prison sentences before a defendant can be sentenced as a persistent felon. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984). More specifically, subdivision
(c) provides that:
For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more previous felony
convictions, convictions, two or more convictions of crimes that were committed
prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such
convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.
Id. § 70.10 (c). Section 70.10 is never mentioned in § 70.08. See id. § 70.08. Instead, § 70.08
states that "[flor purposes of determining whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions, the criteria set forth in Paragraph (b) of Subdivision one of section
70.04 shall apply." Id. Section 70.04(1)(b)(ii) states only that sentence upon the prior conviction must have been imposed before the conviction of the present felony. See id. § 70.04.
Since the legislature chose to cross reference § 70.08 with § 70.04 rather than § 70.10, it is
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Court rewards the cunning criminal-who commits multiple violent
felonies before being apprehended.13 4 It is further submitted that,
by disregarding the maxims of statutory construction and interpretation in construing section 70.08,135 the Court ignored the primary
purpose of recidivist statutes-to deter the commission of
36
crimes.1
When the legislature changes the language of a statute by
137
amendment, a material change is deemed to have been intended.
Applying this maxim, it is suggested that the Court should not
have used the criteria of section 70.10, which concerns persistent
felony offenders, to decide whether prior sentences or convictions
are required in determining whether a person is a persistent violent felony offender. 38 In adding section 70.08, the legislature did
not include a reference to section 70.10, which provides that for a
person to be deemed a persistent felony offender he must have
submitted that the Morse Court has, in effect, thwarted the intent of the legislature.
13' See Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 224-25, 465 N.E.2d at 21, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 514. It is submitted that by applying the majority's rationale, one who commits multiple violent felonies, but
successfully avoids being caught, is in a better position than a criminal whose two prior
violent crimes each ended in his arrest, conviction, and sentencing. Such a result, it is suggested, is in direct contravention of the purpose of the Penal Law, which is "to insure the
public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of
the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted and their confinement when
required in the interest of the public protection." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney
1975).
"' See, e.g., N.Y. STATUTES § 73 (McKinney 1971) (courts should avoid judicial legislation and not review discretion of legislature or question its wisdom); id. § 74 (courts may not
supplement a statute with a provision that it is reasonable to infer legislature intentionally
omitted); id. § 95 (courts in construing statutes should consider the mischief sought to be
remedied). The New York Constitution states that the legislature is to write the laws, N.Y.
CONST. art. III, § 1, and case law consistently has upheld this principle, see, e.g., Wait v.
Allen, 22 N.Y. 319, 321 (1860). This is especially true when interpreting criminal offenses
and punishments. See People v. Blanchard, 288 N.Y. 145, 147-48, 42 N.E.2d 7, 8 (1942);
People v. Persche, 204 N.Y. 397, 401-02, 97 N.E. 877, 878 (1912).
130 See Katkin, supra note 105, at 100.
1'7 See N.Y. STATUTES § 193 (McKinney 1971) (words of statute are to be given meaning intended by legislature). In enacting the persistent violent felony offender statute, §
70.08, the legislature in effect materially changed the persistent felony offender statute, §
70.10, by eliminating an entire class of crimes from that section. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
70.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984). In addition, by removing an entire class of
crimes from § 70.10 and enacting § 70.08, the legislature materially changed the statute by
not imposing the sequentiality requirements of § 70.10 on § 70.08. See id. §§ 70.10, 70.08. It
is suggested that by omitting the sequentiality requirement in § 70.08, the legislature materially changed the criteria to determine which criminals are persistent felons for the purposes of the violent felony offender statute.
"' See Morse, 62 N.Y.2d at 223-25, 465 N.E.2d at 20, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 513-14; N.Y.
PENAL LAW at § 70.10(c) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984).
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served at least two separate prison sentences prior to being sentenced for the most recent offense. 39 Instead, section 70.08 is cross
referenced with section 70.04-which does not contain the requirement of separate sentences found in section 70.10-for purposes of
determining whether a person has committed two or more violent
felony offenses.140 Therefore, it is suggested that the material
change intended by the legislature was not given force by the
court. Thus, it is submitted that the intent of the legislature to
deal more harshly with repeat violent felony offenders coupled
with the conspicuous absence of the requirement for separate
sentences was sufficient to uphold the defendants' sentences as
persistent violent felony offenders.
By enacting section 70.08 of the Penal Law, the legislature has
attempted to deal with criminals who repeatedly commit violent
felonies.14 1 Whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the
legislative intent will ultimately rest with the legislature. 142 It is
strongly urged that in dealing with the problem of violent, career
felons, the legislature should be cognizant of the reality that the
protection of society may very well require unbending severity.
Charles McKenna
Failure of the prosecutor to disclose witness's intention to file a
civil suit against a criminal defendant is a violation of the fourteenth amendment
The duty of a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evidence to a
defendant is a well-established principle rooted in the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 3 Despite the continued vi,39 See supra note 134.
14 See id. It is suggested that by enacting § 70.08 without the sequentiality requirement, the legislature intended to impose enhanced sentences upon violent felony offenders
regardless of when the predicate offenses were committed.
M See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
142 While legislative action is the more conventional way to clarify this situation, judicial consideration is also possible. See State v. Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 173, 333 N.W.2d 391, 393
(1983). In Ellis, the Supreme Court of Nebraska recently reversed itself on the requirement
of sequentiality for determining a predicate conviction. Id. at 174, 333 N.W.2d at 393. The
court held that convictions, not sentences imposed, are determinative for predicate offenses

under the recidivist statute of that state. Id.
M' See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.

103, 112-13 (1935). It was not until 1963 that the United States Supreme Court recognized
the mere failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused as a due process violation. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Prior to Brady, the Court had focused on
prosecutorial misconduct and the use of false evidence as a violation of due process. See

